








In the last decade, there has been a surge in output on various forms of epistemic
marking in language, including (epistemic) modality, evidentiality, mirativity,
egophoricity, and engagement.1 Some of these terms are better known than oth-
ers.2 To begin with, epistemic modality has a long research tradition stemming
1Edited volumes that deserve mention are: Aikhenvald & Dixon (2003; 2014) on evidentiality,
modality, and expressions of knowing in grammar more broadly; Gawne & Hill (2017) on evi-
dentiality in Tibetan languages and Floyd et al. (2018) on egophoricity. The list of journal
articles on epistemic marking in grammar is (very) long, but we may note Evans et al. (2017a,
2017b) on engagement, Bergqvist & Knuchel (2017) on egophoricity, and San Roque et al. (2017)
on evidentials and interrogativity.
2By using terms like “evidentiality” and “egophoricity”, we refer to meaning domains that signal
how knowledge about events can be qualified in different ways. Usually, such domain labels
come with a definition that is found in the seminal literature dealing with a given domain (e.g.
Palmer 2001, for modality), but this is not always the case. Definitional criteria for compara-
ble systems and forms are often contested and in a relatively young field such as the present
one, debates concerning what counts as defining (semantic) features of a certain domain, are
especially fierce. In this volume, a term like “evidentiality” is regarded as constituting a lin-
guistic category in some languages, but consequently also refers to an epistemic domain that
expresses different “modes of access” (Plungian 2010) with respect to how knowledge about
events may be acquired.
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from philosophy and qualifies an utterance in terms of possibility and probabil-
ity, ranging from speculation to high certainty. The first monograph-length treat-
ment of epistemic modality from a cross-linguistic perspective is Palmer (1986;
2001). At about the same time, research on the related category, evidentiality, also
began to gain momentum. Evidentiality signals the source of information that a
speaker has for an utterance. It is often sub-divided into direct and indirect ev-
identials where direct evidentials target the (direct) perception of the speaker,
signaling sensory access (visual, auditory) to a discourse object. Indirect eviden-
tials express other types of cognitive access, such as inference, assumption, and
hearsay, and may be differentiated by how directly accessible a given type of evi-
dence is. For example, inference and assumption are both based on the speaker’s
observation of a state-of-affairs that is not directly related to the event his/her
claim is based on (e.g., we may infer that someone has left if that person’s coat
is gone). Inference is usually based on direct sensory perception, while assump-
tion is often based on our general knowledge of the world, thus differing in type
of indirect access (see e.g. Willett 1988). Aikhenvald (2004) is the first typologi-
cal treatment of evidentiality, but it is Chafe & Nichols’ (1986) seminal volume
that is commonly regarded as the first work to investigate evidentiality from a
cross-linguistic perspective.
Mirativity is regarded as separate from evidentiality by some (e.g. DeLancey
1997), but the ultimate definition of this category (and even its existence) is still
under debate.3
Miratives signal new/non-assimilated knowledge and has often been said to
convey the surprise of the speaker (DeLancey 1997; cf. Aikhenvald 2014). Surprise
as a defining semantic component of mirativity has increasingly been rejected,
however, whereas the signaling of new/non-assimilated information appears to
be more widely accepted (but see Hill 2012 for arguments against the category of
mirativity). In some languages (e.g. Turkish and Finnish), mirativity is found in
specific uses of inferential evidential morphemes, while in other languages (such
as Hare), there is a morpheme whose primary, or even only, function, is to signal
mirativity (DeLancey 1997).
Egophoricity signals the epistemic authority of a speaker or addressee (speech-
act participant) subject to his/her involvement in a talked-about event (Bergqvist
2018a; Bergqvist & Kittilä 2017; cf. Hargreaves 2005). This dialogical property of
the egophoric marker has produced a pattern where egophoric markers occur
in statements with first person subjects and in questions with second person
3See e.g. the debate in Linguistic Typology, involving, among others, Hill (2012), DeLancey (2012),
and Hengeveld & Olbertz (2012).
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subjects: I am leaving. [EGO] vs. Are you leaving? [EGO]. This functional overlap
with person marking has led some to regard egophoric marking as a form of
person marking/agreement, but it is clear from diachronic, distributional, and
semantic criteria that egophoric marking is distinct from person marking (see
Bergqvist & Kittilä 2017, for a discussion). Egophoricity, as a term to designate
this kind of epistemic marking, was proposed by Tournadre (1996: 201), but the
forms he discussed using the term had already been described by Austin Hale
(1980) for Kathmandu Newar, then called “conjunct” (contrasted to “disjunct”).
Subsequent research on the phenomenon called into question the usefulness of
the label “conjunct/disjunct” and various proposals were put forth to replace it
(e.g. “assertors involvement”, Creissels 2008; “congruent/non-congruent”, Dick-
inson 2000). Floyd et al. (2018) opts for the term “egophoricity” in providing a
comprehensive overview of the phenomenon.
“Engagement”, finally, is a term that has had some currency in French linguis-
tics (e.g. Desclés 2009; Guentchéva 2011) and in discourse studies (Hyland 2005),
but in the work of Evans et al. (2017a, 2017b) it is used as a label for a kind of epis-
temic marking separate from the categories outlined above. Engagement targets
the epistemic perspectives of the speech-act participants, signaling differences in
the distribution of knowledge and/or attention between the speaker and the ad-
dressee. As such, it specifies whether information is shared, or exclusive to one of
the speech-act participants. This contrast is exemplified with data from Southern







‘(You and I see that) I am working’
In (1), the semantic contrast between exclusive and shared knowledge is sig-
naled by a zero morpheme and the -ti2.tu3-suffix, respectively.4
While the translation suggests a visual mode of access to go along with such
knowledge asymmetry, this is not encoded in said forms, but signaled by means
of separate evidential morphology (see Kroeker 2001, for details). Engagement
markers are generally underspecified with respect to how knowledge about an
4Kroeker’s label for what we term engagement, is “verification”.
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event is gained, but Evans et al. (2017b) note that engagement markers often
combine with evidentials and modals to signal (a)symmetries in terms of ac-
cessibility to and belief of some event. An issue that relates to the topic of the
present volume in terms of categorical overlap, is whether the assumed distri-
bution of knowledge between the speech-act participants concerns their actual
knowledge/non-knowledge, or their rights/non-rights to knowledge (see Grzech
2020 [this volume]). It is possible that this contrast in terms of knowledge ac-
cess and rights to knowledge is subject to variation across engagement systems.
While engagement has yet to be widely accepted as a grammatical category in
some languages, arguments for making such a claim are put forth in §3.3, below.
The organization of this introductory chapter is as follows: In §2, we will dis-
cuss the functional and semantic overlaps between the discussed categories on a
general level. In §3, we will focus on the relation between the discussed categories
as resources for expressing epistemic authority, and in §4, we will summarize the
main points of the paper and suggest some ideas for future research.
2 Functional and semantic overlap between categories
It is a widely known fact that the abovementioned categories overlap in form,
meaning, and function (see Cornillie 2009; de de Haan 1999; inter alia). This has
been especially noted with respect to modality and evidentiality, where an En-
glish modal verb like must may be treated as a modal, or an evidential depending
on the context of use. Such ambiguity has led some researchers to analyze eviden-
tiality as a subtype of modality (e.g. Palmer 1986; Palmer 2001), whereas others
have argued for a strict separation between the two categories (e.g. Aikhenvald
2004).
A comparable overlap has also been observed for evidentiality, mirativity, and
egophoricity. With respect to evidentiality and mirativity, an inferential (eviden-
tial) form may also serve as a mirative depending on the context of use, as in Turk-
ish (Slobin & Aksu 1982). Evidentiality and egophoricity overlap to the extent
that egophoric markers may be part of evidential paradigms and thus contrast
with evidential forms. Semantically, some have argued that egophoric marking
cannot be regarded as a kind of evidential marking due to the fact that such mark-
ers do not signal a source of information as such (e.g. Aikhenvald 2004). Others
have argued the opposite and regard egophoric markers as the strongest kind of
access that speakers employ to justify a statement (Plungian 2010; San Roque &
Loughnane 2012; cf. Boye 2012, evidentiality as “justification”). Egophoric mark-
ers have sometimes been analyzed as a kind of mirative marker for Tibetan and
4
1 Epistemic perspectives
Barbacoan languages (DeLancey 1997; Dickinson 2000; but see Curnow 2002, for
a critique). Kittilä (forthcoming), shows that egophoric markers have features in
common with general knowledge/factual evidentials and that claims of factuality
may formally resemble markers of both visual evidence and volitional participa-
tion in an event.
Several papers in this volume discuss categorical overlaps of the kind sketched
above. We will mention a few of them here. Liljegren notes for the Indo-Aryan
language Palula that indirect evidentiality is produced by the contextualized
token-use of perfect forms in addition to employing sentence final particles de-
noting hearsay and inference. The use of aspectual forms and particles to serve
evidential functions are a commonly noted phenomenon, which has also been at-
tested for Turkic (Slobin & Aksu 1982), Caucasian (Tatevosov 2001), and Persian
languages (Lazard 1996).
Grzech accounts for epistemic markers in a variety of Quechua that previ-
ously have been described as evidentials, but which Grzech analyzes as signaling
epistemic authority. Given the defining role of epistemic authority in egophoric
marking, this constitutes a clear case of conceptual overlap between the two cat-
egories where a set of evidential markers (i.e. that are cognate to evidentials in re-
lated languages) have developed egophoric semantics. While assigning epistemic
authority is implied by the use of direct and indirect evidentials (see §3.1, below),
it has become encoded in Tena Kichwa, an Ecuadorian variety of Quechua. Con-
versely, languages with egophoric marking (see e.g. Tournadre 2008) may imply
the cognitive access that a speaker claims for making an assertion, while the
speaker’s epistemic authority is encoded in the form (see §3.2, below).
For Kalapalo, Basso accounts for an enormously rich variety of epistemic mark-
ers with different grammatical status that includes modal and evidential notions,
but which also feature participation and the positioning of knowledge between
the speech-act participants. In a language like Kalapalo, it may not be fruitful to
base categorical distinctions on formal criteria, given their distribution in differ-
ent parts of the grammar. Rather than a small number of forms serving many
functions, Kalapalo has many forms serving overlapping functions, thus consti-
tuting an entirely different kind of categorical overlap than the one that e.g. Lil-
jegren reports for Palula.
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3 The relation between evidentiality, egophoricity, and
engagement
How may we account for the overlaps discussed above? The conceptual overlap
between categories is evident from a functionalist perspective, but how this corre-
sponds to their semanto-pragmatic properties and distinct development requires
further discussion. With respect to the development of markers belonging to the
categories that are the topic of the present volume, it is clear that the presence
of pragmatically contingent components of meaning (e.g. inference as a token-
feature of perfects) makes possible an eventual encoding of this implied feature
to become part of the semantics of a form. This conventionalization of impli-
cature (Levinson 2000) is a driving force in grammaticalization processes more
generally and we may observe this for epistemic marking, as well (see Bergqvist
2018a). The aim of this section is to account for how implied meaning in the use
of certain markers suggests the relation between the investigated categories and
the reason for the frequently attested overlaps between categories.
3.1 Cognitive access vs. (dis)claiming epistemic authority:
Evidentiality
The notion of evidentiality in language has been equated with providing justi-
fication for how information was acquired, i.e. the source of information that a
speaker has for making an assertion about an event. Willett (1988) is still a good
starting point for an illustration of the basic semantic features and divisions rel-














Figure 1.1: Evidential categories (after Willett 1988)
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There is an implicit expectation for the speaker to provide the highest form
of evidence for an assertion, which produces a hierarchical relation in terms of
strength of evidence. Direct evidentials conveying “visual” access (i.e. ‘I know
this from having seen it’) usually constitutes a stronger form of evidence than
other sensory access (i.e. ‘I know this from having heard/felt/smelt it’). It is, how-
ever, important to note that states-of-affairs display variation in this regard. For
example, olfactory evidence is more direct and reliable for a claim like ‘There
must be a gas leak here somewhere’, and tactile evidence outranks visual evi-
dence for claims such as ‘The water is hot’. In general, though, visual evidence
ranks highest, a suggestion that is supported by the use of visual evidential forms
to express participatory/factual evidence in some languages (see §3.2, below). For
indirect evidentials, it is possible to argue that making an inference based on e.g.
visual evidence (i.e. ‘I know this because I know/see what caused it’) is a stronger
form of assertion than one based on report (i.e. ‘I know this because someone
told me about it’). As stated above, inference and assumption are in principle
very similar types of evidence, and both of them are classified as personal and in-
direct evidence by Plungian (2010: 37). However, these two evidence types differ
from each other as regards their directness and reliability; inference is based on
a more reliable (usually directly observable) evidence, while assumption is based
on our general knowledge of the world (see the definitions offered by Plungian
2010: 37). We can also see that the hierarchical relation between direct and in-
direct evidence in terms of strength may not always hold, since e.g. “folklore”,
as a kind of reported evidential (i.e. ‘I know this from (our) oral tradition’), may
be deemed a very reliable source despite the fact that no member of the speech
community has direct access to the events portrayed.
Possibly the most thoroughly investigated aspect of evidentiality is reported
speech,5 which also corresponds to the “simplest” kind of evidential system where
reported speech is the only evidential marker. Estonian exemplifies such a sys-
tem with only a hearsay marker (see Aikhenvald 2004 for details). But despite
this emphasis on reported speech in the literature on evidentiality, a narrow con-
ception of evidentiality as a verbal category tends to emphasize the role of direct
perception (i.e. visual, auditory) in grammaticalized evidentiality systems. In de
Haan’s (2013) survey of evidential systems, however, systems that feature both
direct and indirect evidentials are much less common than systems with only
5This is an impressionistic claim that would be difficult to substantiate statistically given the (by
now) vast literature on evidentiality. Reportive evidentials were, however, discussed as early
as Jakobson (1957) and has continued to occupy research on European languages as well as
more cross-linguistically oriented research (see e.g. Boye 2012).
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indirect evidentials. Evidential systems with only direct evidentials are not at-
tested at all in the survey. From this cross-linguistic patterning, we may gather
that the grammatical expression of evidentiality is primarily a means to signal
indirect access to events, and that this indirect access sometimes is (explicitly)
contrasted to direct access. In the default case (i.e. indirect access to an event),
evidentiality is not so much a strategy to signal ownership of knowledge through
some cognitive channel, but a disclaimer of epistemic authority as a consequence
of restricted (i.e. indirect) sensory access (cf. Mushin 2001).
Signaling indirect access to an event in terms of inference, or assumption, does
not necessarily mean that there is a restriction present on the sensory access that
a speaker has to the talked-about event. In data resulting from the use of an in-
teractive elicitation task developed by Nick Evans and colleagues (described in
San Roque et al. 2012), it is clear that explicit, visual representations of people,
things, and events will prompt the use of inferentials and assumptives even in
cases where such representations appear unambiguous (e.g. Quartararo 2017).
The simple fact that depicted events and people are outside of the speaker’s do-
main of epistemic authority, may be sufficient to warrant a more cautious ap-
proach to asserting such events by using indirect evidentials. The speaker may
mark an event as being inferred from his/her point of view, rather than claiming
direct perceptual access to the contents of the picture, possibly because such con-
tents pertain to previously unknown characters in a fictional universe. Curnow
(2003) discusses the use of non-visual/indirect forms with first person subjects
to produce unintentional/non-volitional readings of utterances (see Example 2b,
below). Such interpretation effects are in line with the hypothesis that indirect
evidentials function as disclaimers of epistemic authority. However, it is also
possible to use evidentials to claim epistemic authority by means of direct evi-
dentials. This may be a less prominent function of evidentials, but one that links
evidentiality to egophoricity (see §3.2, below). Just like indirect evidentials may
be used even in cases where the speaker has direct sensory access to a talked
about event, so are direct evidentials sometimes used to signal other forms of
access than their semantics may suggest (i.e. visual, auditory). One such form of
access that may be signaled by the use of direct evidentials, is “(volitional) partici-
pation”. Participatory meaning in the context of evidentiality may result from the
distribution of direct evidential forms with subject pronouns (i.e. first vs. third
person), or they can constitute distinct forms that are part of paradigms along-
side other direct forms that signal visual access to the referent (see Example 3,
below). Examples of how the distribution of direct evidentials may produce par-
ticipatory meaning according to subject person, is discussed by Curnow (2002:













‘I broke the plate accidentally (I didn’t see it on the table).’
Curnow discusses the examples from Tucano as an instance of interpretation
effects resulting from the distribution of forms signaling a visual/non-visual con-
trast with first person subjects. Such effects are also reported for other languages
and depending on what evidentials are present in each language, different effects
may arise (see Curnow 2002; 2003 for details).
In Central Pomo, the evidential paradigm contains a form, -la, which denotes




‘I caught it.’ (I know because I did it)
It should be noted that performative, or participatory, evidentials assume part
of the function of person agreement, given the implied agency of a first person
subject in such forms. Subject identity is not an encoded feature, however, and
reference to the actions of third person subjects featuring performative/partici-
patory forms may produce a factual reading that corresponds in epistemic sta-
tus to participatory meaning when referring to events and actions involving the
speaker. This means that factual events involving third persons may be marked
in the same way as events involving one of the speech-act participants as a partic-
ipant. Bergqvist & Kittilä (2017; cf. Bergqvist 2015) explores participation/involve-
ment as part of evidential systems in order to place this notion against egophoric
marking, in which volitional participation/involvement has been suggested as a
defining notion (see directly below). One reason to make such a comparison re-
lates to the ongoing debate on whether egophoric marking is a kind of evidential
marker, or if egophoric marking constitutes a separate grammatical expression
altogether. If “source of information” (Aikhenvald 2004) is the preferred defini-
tion, then participation will be difficult to accommodate within such a definition
(but see San Roque & Loughnane 2012 for a discussion). If viewed from the per-
spective of epistemic marking in language, more generally, then cognitive access
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to events must be situated against related means to signal access more broadly,
including access from participation/involvement (see Bergqvist 2017; cf. Boye
2012).
3.2 Involvement and epistemic authority: Egophoricity
Egophoricity is a recently proposed term for a form of epistemic marking that
prototypically occurs with first and second person subjects in declarative and
interrogative clauses, respectively (see Floyd et al. 2018, for a cross-linguistic
overview). Egophoricity is also known as “conjunct/disjunct”-marking in the lit-
erature (e.g. Bickel & Nichols 2007), but competing terms also exist (see §1, above).
Example (4) portrays the two combinations of subject person and sentence type
that trigger egophoric marking in Kathmandu Newar (Hale 1980). All other com-
binations of subject person and sentence-type produces non-egophoric marking
(i.e. 1S+interrogative/2S+declarative/3S+any sentence type):
















‘Did you go there?’
In addition to this distributional pattern, there are also restrictions on what
verbs may take the egophoric marker. In Kathmandu Newar, only verbs that fea-
ture (volitional) agents are permitted. The contrast between verbs that denote
























Bergqvist & Knuchel (2017) take a broad approach to analyzing egophoric
marking by outlining the boundaries of speech-act participant involvement in
such systems. Although the volitional actions of a speech-act participant pur-
portedly are a defining semantic component of egophoric marking, it has become
increasingly clear that this is not the only kind of involvement that may trigger
the use of an egophoric marker. Involvement as a basis for epistemic authority
may in some instances target the affectedness, or even the attitude of a speak-
er/addressee (Bergqvist & Knuchel 2017: 369). Given that such an encompassing
formulation of involvement is applicable to some egophoric markers, Bergqvist &
Knuchel propose that “epistemic authority” is actually the core semantic notion
that may define egophoric marking against other forms of epistemic marking,
such as evidentials and epistemic modals. Focusing on the notion of epistemic
authority also bridges the gap to seemingly unrelated phenomena such as “eth-
ical datives”, which share formal and functional features with egophoric mark-
ing, as described for a language like Standard Tibetan (see Bergqvist & Knuchel
2017, for details). The involvement of a speech-act participant produces a kind of
epistemic inalienability that permits the speaker to assign epistemic authority to
him/herself, or the addressee without necessarily specifying what this involve-
ment consists of.
The notion of epistemic authority may be conceptualized as a driving force in
verbal interaction more generally and serves to situate information with respect
to the speech-act participants. As such, it goes well beyond the use of egophoric
markers in languages where this is an attested form of epistemic marking. For
English (arguably a language without egophoric marking), the notion of epis-
temic authority may be seen in the correspondence between sentence-type and
communicative function, an issue that has concerned speech-act theory since its
formulation (Searle 1969). Sometimes an assertion may function as a question in
a communicative sense, and vice versa. In fact, the majority of polar questions in
American English have the form of an assertion (Stivers 2010; Stivers & Rossano
2010). In order to explain this apparent discrepancy, Heritage (2012) argues that
the notions, “epistemic status” and “epistemic stance” are key for understanding
discrepancies between grammatical form and (social) action. Epistemic status, as
an index of relative epistemic authority, is formulated with reference to the no-
tion of A and B-events (Labov & Fanshel 1977), where A-events are known only
to the speaker (speaker authority) and B-events are known only to the addressee
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(addressee authority). Typical B-events include the addressee’s opinions, beliefs,
and bodily states, but may also include his/her professional expertise. Heritage
offers the following definition of epistemic status:
(W)e can consider relative epistemic access to a domain as stratified be-
tween actors such that they occupy different positions on an epistemic gra-
dient (more knowledgeable [K+] or less knowledgeable [K−]), which itself
may vary in slope from shallow to deep […]. We will refer to this relative
positioning as epistemic status, in which persons recognize one another to
be more or less knowledgeable concerning some domain of knowledge (…)
(Heritage 2012: 32)
The speaker’s epistemic stance can be congruent or incongruent with the
speaker’s epistemic status, as seen in the example, you’re married, provided by
Heritage, which may be understood as a request for confirmation despite its as-
sertive formulation, given that it pertains to the addressee’s marital status. A
statement such as, you’re sad, using an assertive form, may be deemed incongru-
ent to the speaker’s epistemic status, given that it must be regarded as K-, given
the addressee’s obvious epistemic authority over his/her own emotional states.
Speakers of any language continuously keep track of what others know and
how their own knowledge can be related to the knowledge of others, and Her-
itage offers us a detailed and empirically grounded picture of how this works
in everyday conversation. Such assumptions most prominently involve the ad-
dressee and explicit formulations of how the addressee’s perspective is attended
to have received some attention in the field of discourse studies, notably in work
by Ken Hyland (e.g. 1999; 2001; 2005). More recently, cross-linguistic research
has led to the formulation of “engagement” as a bona fide epistemic category
in some languages (see Evans et al. 2017a) and the relation between engagement
and epistemic authority deserves to be explored in the definition of both notions.
3.3 Shared vs. non-shared access/rights to knowledge: Engagement
Engagement consists of a contrast between the speaker’s assertion about the ad-
dressee’s knowledge of/attention to an event (e) as either shared or non-shared
with the speaker. I know e and I assume that you know e too, is contrasted with, I
know e and I assume that you do not (Evans et al. 2017a; cf. “complex perspective”,
Evans 2005; cf. “complex epistemic perspective”, Bergqvist 2015; 2016; 2017). This
semantic contrast may in principle concern any aspect of epistemicity, and is as
such relevant for any form of epistemic marking (see below). Engagement tar-
gets “knowing” from a socio-centric perspective, where the speaker’s assertion
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contains an embedded assertion assumed to belong to the addressee. Such as-
sumptions may be implied in the token-use of other forms of epistemic marking,
but in a language with engagement as a category, this implicature has become
encoded in forms to signal asymmetries in the knowledge/attention states of the
speech-act participants.
In Kogi (Arwako-Chibchan; Bergqvist 2016; cf. Ortíz Ricaurte 1994), speakers
can choose one of four auxiliary prefixes that encode engagement.6 These pre-
fixes may be divided into two sets that take the speaker and the addressee as their
respective starting points. A focus on the perspective of the speaker is found with
na-/ni-, where na- means that ‘the speaker knows e and expects the addressee to
be unaware of e’ (6a), and ni- means that ‘the speaker knows e and expects the











‘I am/was dancing.’ (confirming)
Na-/ni- are in turn contrasted to sha-/shi-, which encode a corresponding dis-
tinction in terms of non-shared/shared knowledge from the addressee’s perspec-
tive. sha- means that ‘the speaker expects the addressee to know e while the
speaker is unaware of e’ (7a), and shi- means that ‘the speaker expects the ad-













‘You are/were dancing(?)’ (confirming)
6Bergqvist (2015; 2016; 2017) discusses the Kogi system using the term “complex epistemic per-
spective” without arguing for a more general applicability of this term to similar systems and
forms in the literature. Such applicability is, however, considered in Evans et al. (2017a, 2017b)
under the term engagement.
13
Henrik Bergqvist & Seppo Kittilä
Shi-/sha- are used to signal the speaker’s acknowledgement of the addressee as
primary knower, but at the same time encodes the speaker’s assertion (without
reduced certainty) of a talked about event.
Engagement in Kogi may appear to be an exotic system in a little-known lan-
guage, but this notion echoes with well-known phenomena like modal particles
in Germanic languages (modal particle). Descriptive accounts of cognates of the
German ja (‘as you know’/‘of course’, Abraham 1991), in Danish (jo, Davidsen-
Nielsen 1996), Norwegian (jo, Andvik 1992) and Swedish (ju, Lindström 2008)
agree that reflexes of this form signals “available knowledge through shared ex-
perience” (Lindström 2008: 74, for Swedish).7 But although modal particles are
relatively frequent in e.g. spoken Swedish (see Bergqvist 2017), they are gener-
ally not viewed as part of core grammar, given their non-obligatoriness, weakly
paradigmatic organization, and function as markers of discourse. Modal particles
have an established (Eurocentric) descriptive tradition, but have recently been
compared to analogous particles in non-European languages such as Chinese
and Japanese (e.g. Abraham & Leiss 2012). A continued exploration of modal par-
ticles by means of cross-linguistic comparison, will surely contribute to a more
developed understanding of engagement as a linguistic category.
From the typological overview presented in Evans et al. (2017b), it is clear that
engagement can combine with modals and evidentials and that the shared/non-
shared contrast may fuse with such forms of epistemic marking. Hintz & Hintz
(2017) account for evidentials in Sihuas Quechua and argue that this language
has developed two distinct sets of evidential markers, which feature an -i/-a al-
teration encoding individual/mutual knowledge, respectively. Papuan languages
like Foe (Rule 1977) and Angal (Sillitoe 2010) also display engagement semantics
fused with evidential forms that produce readings like ‘as I could see, but you
could not’. Schultze-Berndt (2017) reports that markers of epistemic authority
in Jaminjung (Mirndi, Australia) are contrasted according to whether epistemic
authority is considered to be shared, or exclusive to one of the speech-act partic-
ipants.
Ika, a language closely related to Kogi (above), features a version of egophoric
marking that mirrors some of the semantic contrasts found in Kogi, but by way
7For Danish, Davidsen-Nielsen argues that “jo signals that the hearer is assumed to be aware of
and accept the states of affairs described [...]” (Davidsen-Nielsen 1996: 285). He notes that the
notion of something being “familiar to the receiver” is subject to some variation, but that the
semantic component of including the hearer’s perspective remains part of utterences featuring
jo in Danish (Davidsen-Nielsen 1996: 293). For Norwegian, Berthelin et al. (2013) note that
the meaning of jo encodes that “the hearer and speaker both have access to all the evidence
required for entertaining p as true”.
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of a distinct system that signals the involvement of the speech participants in re-
lation to their respective epistemic authorities (Bergqvist 2012; 2018b;2018a). The
epistemic marking systems in Kogi and Ika shows how a functional pressure to
assign epistemic authority to one, or both of the speech-act participants may pro-
duce distinct systems in closely related languages. Drawing on this comparison,
Bergqvist (2018a) argues that any subjective evaluation/positioning may develop
a sensitivity to whether this is shared with the addressee, or not, and that the pos-
sibility of such a development stems from the very nature of indexical reference.
An eventual typology of engagement must answer questions regarding its rel-
evant dimensions of meaning, i.e. whether encoded (a)symmetries of knowing
concern the assimilated knowledge of the addressee, or the speech-act partici-
pant’s respective rights to know in terms of epistemic authority. With respect
to the diachronic development of engagement, this must be accounted for in the
context of engagement being part of related functional categories, but also as a
distinct grammatical expression.
4 Concluding thoughts and a view to the future
From the overview and discussion provided in this introductory chapter, it should
be clear that evidentiality, egophoricity, and engagement are closely related no-
tions that overlap in both form and function. The notion of epistemic authority
is argued to be central to a functional analysis of said categories, either as an un-
derlying (largely implicit) motivation for the use of evidentials, or as a defining
semantic component of egophoric marking. It may also be assigned to one, or
both, of the speech-act participants by forms of engagement. The general role of
epistemic authority as an integral part of the “epistemic engine” that drives ver-
bal communication (Heritage 2012) lends further support to idea that epistemic
authority is a key concern for speakers engaged in conversation.
In order to explore epistemicity in language with this focus, interactive lan-
guage data is required. The dialogic function of language was discussed as a
defining feature of language already by Jespersen (1922), but throughout the 20th
Century this function all but disappeared from linguistic analysis (but see Givón
2001; Halliday 1973). Recently, dialogicity has come back on the agenda in re-
search by Du Bois (2007; 2014) and Evans (2012), among others. A return to the
dialogical features of language use and its consequences for grammar appears
crucial to account for the ongoing exploration of epistemic marking strategies in
languages everywhere.
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Abbreviations
1 first person
1S first person subject
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